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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that private property shall not ". . . be taken for public use
without just compensation."1 The purpose of this clause is to "bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole."2 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Supreme Court held that a government regulation that deprives a
landowner of all economically beneficial use of his land is a taking
unless the use prohibited amounts to a nuisance.3 While this deci-
sion was a step in the "right" direction, the narrow holding of
Lucas only applies in rare cases where the affected land is left
with no economically beneficial use. Much more common is the
situation found in King v. North Carolina, 4 where the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals upheld a state regulation which decreased
the value of the plaintiffs land by prohibiting the best and most
efficient use of the land, but did not totally diminish the value of
the land.
In so doing, the court erroneously interpreted Lucas as hold-
ing that a government regulation amounts to a taking only where
it deprives the land of all economically beneficial use. This note
will examine the decision in King and analyze the facts of this
case under the correct interpretation of Lucas. Part II of this note
will present the facts and procedural history of King. Part III will
demonstrate that the Lucas rule, as applied in King was errone-
ous, and will analyze the facts of King under the correct interpre-
tation of Lucas.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF KING
Ruth A. King owned an eight acre peninsula extending into
the Topsail Sound in Pender County, North Carolina.5 In the late
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
3. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
4. King v. North Carolina, 125 N.C. App. 379, 481 S.E.2d 330 (1997).
5. King v. North Carolina, 112 N.C. App. 813, 436 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1993).
1
Wells: King v. North Carolina: A Misinterpretation of the Lucas Takings
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
1980's, King granted power of attorney over the peninsula to her
son, Walter A. Warren, so that he could develop the property.6
Warren then initiated his plan to construct a marl/rock road along
the middle of the peninsula, with residential lots on both sides of
the road.7 However, in order to construct this road, Warren would
have had to fill in approximately two acres of low-lying land in the
center portion of the peninsula.' This low-lying area was subject
to runoff from the rest of the peninsula and to flooding during
storm tides.9
In July of 1988, Warren was ordered by the Coastal Area
Management Act 10 office (CAMA) in Surf City to cease and desist
further development of the peninsula." The order resulted from
Warren's failure to obtain a permit in regard to the interior two
acres of the peninsula which CAMA identified as an area of "envi-
ronmental concern."' 2 The next month, Warren was notified by
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (COE) that the inte-
rior two acres of the peninsula were considered "wetlands."'3 As a
result, Warren was required to obtain a permit from the COE pur-
suant to § 404 of the Clean Water Act,' 4 prior to continuing devel-
opment. Further, before the COE could issue a § 404 permit,
Warren had to provide the COE with certification, pursuant to
§ 401 of the Clean Water Act, that the proposed fill would not vio-
late state water quality standards.' 5 In North Carolina, the Divi-
sion of Environmental Management (DEM) reviews § 401
certification requests, and the Environmental Management Com-
mission (EMC) makes the final decision regarding the
certification.' 6
6. Id.
7. Id. at 814, 436 S.E.2d at 867.
8. Id.
9. King, 125 N.C. App. at 381, 481 S.E.2d at 331.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to -134.3 (1994). This act, among other
things, establishes an office that grants or denies building permits in the coastal
areas of North Carolina.
11. King, 112 N.C. App. at 813, 436 S.E.2d at 866.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. King, 125 N.C. App. at 381, 481 S.E.2d at 331(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(1986)).
15. Id.
16. King, 125 N.C. App. at 381, 481 S.E.2d at 331.
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The EMC denied Warren's request for certification. 7 The
EMC based its decision primarily on the findings of the DEM that
the interior two acres of King's property served as a filter,
preventing certain harmful nutrients and sediments from seeping
into surrounding shellfish beds, and that reasonable alternatives
less harmful to the environment than Warren's proposal existed.' 8
The alternatives to Warren's proposed development scheme
included moving the road to the south end, rather than the center,
of the peninsula, and/or building some of the proposed houses on
pilings. 9
In December of 1991, King (through Warren) filed a petition
for judicial review of the EMC's denial of the § 401 certification.
The Pender County Superior Court reversed the decision of the
EMC2 ° holding that the DEM findings regarding the function of
the wetland as a filter, and the existence of reasonable develop-
ment alternatives, were in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency, were not supported by substantial evidence, and were
arbitrary and capricious. 2
The EMC appealed the trial court's reversal of its decision to
the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The court stated that a
court reviewing an agency decision must apply the "whole record
test,"22 under which the reviewing judge determines whether
there is substantial evidence in the whole record to justify the
agency's decision.23 Then appellate review of the lower court's
determination is limited to determining whether the lower court
properly applied the whole record test.24 Based on this standard
of review, the court of appeals held that the lower court had mis-
applied the "whole record test", in effect substituting his own judg-
ment for that of the agency.25 Thus, the EMC denial of the § 401
certification was upheld on appeal.
Concurrent with the above described action, King filed suit
claiming that the agency's denial of her § 401 certification limited
the use of her property to the extent that she was denied all rea-
17. Id. at 382, 481 S.E.2d at 331.
18. King, 112 N.C. App. at 815, 436 S.E.2d at 867
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 816, 436 S.E.2d at 868 (citing Wiggins v. Dept. of Human Resources,
105 N.C. App. 302, 413 S.E.2d 3 (1992)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 817, 426 S.E.2d at 869
25. Id. at 818, 426 S.E.2d at 869.
1998]
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sonable use of her property, thus resulting in a taking of her prop-
erty without just compensation. 26 The State moved for summary
judgment on the basis that King failed to meet a material element
of her claim-i.e. that the total denial of the certification resulted
in the total deprivation of reasonable use of her property." The
State claimed that the holding in the previous case, challenging
the validity of the agency decision, was binding on King here.2"
As a result, King still had reasonable use of her property because
the denial of the § 401 certification affected only one quarter of her
property and reasonable alternatives to the proposed development
existed.29
In response to the State's motion for summary judgment,
King offered affidavits from two experts, James L. Powell and Col-
lice C. Moore. Mr. Powell, a registered land surveyor, presented
his opinion that the only practical way to subdivide the peninsula
was with the road running along the middle-otherwise, Powell
opined, some houses would have to be built on stilts or, bridges
would have to be built from one side of the peninsula to the
other 3 0 The implication of this testimony was that because
houses on pilings are less valuable that ones not on pilings, and
because bridges are expensive to construct, the property would not
be worth developing in the manner recommended by the DEM.
King also offered the affidavit of Collice C. Moore, a licensed real
estate appraiser, who claimed the property would be worth
$1,360,000.00 if developed according to Warren's plan, but would
be worth only $3,700.00 if not developed. Moore's opinion was
based on the assumption that Warren's proposed plan was the
only reasonable way to develop the peninsula.3 1
Notwithstanding these affidavits, the trial court granted the
state's motion for summary judgment.32 The court treated the
DEM findings as binding on King due to the previous suit whereby
the EMC decision was upheld by the court of appeals; thus the
affidavits presented by King were of no effect because they either
stated or assumed that no reasonable alternatives existed to War-
26. King, 125 N.C. App. at 382, 481 S.E.2d at 332.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 383, 481 S.E. 2d at 332.
29. King, 125 N.C. App. at 384, 481 S.E.2d at 333.
30. Id. at 382, 481 S.E.2d at 332.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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ren's proposed development, in contradiction to the binding DEM
findings. 3
King appealed the trial court's decision to the North Carolina
Court of Appeals. The court upheld the trial court's treatment of
the DEM findings as binding on King. Further, the court stated
that in Lucas, 4 the United States Supreme Court identified two
situations where government regulation results in a taking: "reg-
ulations that compel physical invasions of property and regula-
tions that deny an owner all economically beneficial or productive
use of property."35 The court then held that, because reasonable
alternatives to the proposed development exist, the denial of a
permit to fill in the wetlands in this case did not deprive King of
all economically beneficial use, and thus there was no taking of
property without just compensation.3 6  The North Carolina
Supreme Court denied discretionary review.37
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court of Appeals' Misinterpretation of the Lucas
Takings Rule
In King, the North Carolina Court of Appeals correctly stated
that Lucas identified two instances where a government regula-
tion can amount to a taking of private property for which just com-
pensation is required. In particular, the court stated that Lucas
requires just compensation where (1) a regulation compels physi-
cal invasion of the property, and (2) a regulation deprives the
owner of all economically beneficial use of his property.38 Apply-
ing these two categories to the facts in King, the court of appeals
determined that the State's denial of the water quality certifica-
tion did not compel a physical invasion of King's peninsula, nor
did it deprive King of all economically beneficial use of her prop-
erty since reasonable alternatives to Warren's plan existed.39
Assuming the DEM findings regarding reasonable development
alternatives were accurate, to this point the court was correct in
its analysis.
33. Id. at 383, 481 S.E.2d at 332.
34. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
35. King, 125 N.C. App. at 385, 481 S.E.2d at 333.
36. Id. at 386, 481 S.E.2d at 334.
37. King v. North Carolina, 346 N.C. 280, 487 S.E.2d 548 (1997).
38. King, 125 N.C. App. at 385, 481 S.E.2d at 333.
39. Id. at 385, 481 S.E.2d at 334.
1998]
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But it is at this point that the court erred. The court of
appeals then concluded that because the facts in King did not fall
into either of the two categories described in Lucas, no taking had
occurred.4 ° In other words, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reads Lucas as creating only two categories in which government
regulation amounts to a taking-any case falling outside these
categories, according to the court of appeals, is not a taking. But
the majority opinion in Lucas does not stand for this proposition.
Justice Stevens raised this precise issue in his dissent in Lucas.
There, he stated that the majority's rule in Lucas seemed wholly
arbitrary because the owner who is deprived of 95% of the value of
his property would receive nothing while the owner deprived of
100% of its value is fully compensated.4 ' In response to Justice
Stevens' concern, in a footnote to his majority opinion, Scalia
wrote that
"[Justice Stevens'] analysis errs in its assumption that the land-
owner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is not enti-
tled to compensation. Such an owner might not be able to claim
the benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have
acknowledged time and again, '[tihe economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant and.., the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with the distinct investment-backed expectations' are
keenly relevant to takings analysis generally."42 (emphasis added).
Thus, the correct interpretation of Lucas is that there are
indeed two situations where government regulations on the use of
private property are categorically considered to be takings-i.e.
regulations that compel physical invasions of the property,43 and
regulations which deprive owners of all economically beneficial
use of their property.44 However, where a certain fact pattern
does not fit into one of these two categories, the court must ana-
lyze the facts based on other takings jurisprudence. That is,
40. Id.
41. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064.
42. Id. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
43. This rule is originally set forth in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Here, a New York law required landlords to
permit the installation of cable television facilities inside their property for the
benefit of the tenants. The Court held that a regulation permitting a permanent
physical invasion was a taking without regard to the public interests the
regulation might serve and without regard to how minor the occupation.
44. The exception to this rule, of course, is where the regulation merely
prohibits a use that amounts to a nuisance. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022.
(Vol. 21:67
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Lucas does not stand for the proposition that these two narrow
categories are the only instances where a taking results. Yet in
King, the North Carolina court of appeals interpreted the Lucas
rule in this manner.
The Lucas rule only applies when a regulation deprives a
property owner of all economically beneficial use of his property.
This rule was made even more narrow by Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent in Lucas where he stated that the South Carolina trial court
was mistaken in finding that the plaintiffs property in Lucas had
lost all economic value.45 According to Justice Blackmun, plain-
tiffs lots still had value because he could still exclude others, "...
picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable
trailer."46 This statement by Justice Blackmun is effectively pro-
viding a roadmap for trial courts to avoid the Lucas rule alto-
gether by finding that some value still exists in the property.
Justice Blackmun ignores the fact that Lucas paid almost 1 mil-
lion dollars for the two lots; a hefty price for the right to exclude
others and go swimming. Due to this narrow nature of the Lucas
rule, it is reasonable to assume that the Court did not intend for
the two categories to be the only situations where government reg-
ulation can amount to a taking.
As alluded to in Lucas, when the regulation is not severe
enough to completely devalue the land, traditional takings analy-
sis must be employed.47 Yet plaintiffs and courts generally seem
to ignore this. The Lucas rule has quite an appeal to plaintiffs as
a result of its apparent simplicity; but this simplicity is deceptive.
Plaintiffs relish the idea that, to prevail, all that they must show
is that the regulation has deprived them of all economically bene-
ficial use. In most instances, plaintiffs likely believe that they
have been deprived of all economically beneficial use because the
government has taken away the only use the plaintiff desired.
Reasonable alternatives may exist, however. The practical effect
of the Lucas rule, then, is that nearly all plaintiffs bringing tak-
ings actions craft their complaints such that it appears that the
regulation has the severe effect required by Lucas on their prop-
erty.4" In so doing, they may fail to allege additional facts that
45. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044.
46. Id.
47. Blank
48. The plaintiff in King did this, as did the plaintiff in another recent North
Carolina case, Messer v. Chapel Hill, 125 N.C. App. 57, 479 S.E.2d 221 (1997).
There, the plaintiff alleged that an amendment to a zoning ordinance effectively
1998]
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may be relevant to the traditional takings analysis and will be
necessary if the court finds that the owner has not been deprived
of all economically beneficial use. The court merely responds to
the arguments raised by the parties, so if the parties concentrate
on the issue of whether the property is deprived of all economi-
cally beneficial use, so will the court. As a result, once the court
decides this issue, the parties and the court will assume that is
the end. Yet clearly under Lucas, if this issue is decided in the
negative, the analysis must continue under "traditional" takings
jurisprudence.
B. "Traditional" Takings Analysis
It is no wonder that plaintiffs seek to frame their complaints
so that the Lucas rule will apply. "Traditional" takings law does
not offer much guidance nor assurance to plaintiffs whereas the
Lucas rule seems simple, or at least understandable. It is a rule
that a plaintiff can sink his teeth into, unlike the traditional tak-
ings law.
Prior to 1922, the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution was generally believed to reach only direct
appropriations of property-e.g. land taken to build a road. In
that year, however, the Supreme Court decided its first regulatory
takings case.49 Justice Holmes announced the general rule that,
"... while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."5" In an attempt
to define what is "too far," Justice Holmes discussed three "tests"
relevant to whether a taking has occurred,51 however each test
has ambiguities.
Under Justice Holmes' first test, the diminution in value must
be considered. One must compare the value of the land with the
regulation to the value of the land without the regulation. If the
regulation "goes too far," a taking has occurred. 2 But Justice
Holmes did not define how much diminution in value "goes too
far." After Lucas, one does know that if the value of the land after
rendered his property valueless; the amendment changed the minimum lot size
for residential units on plaintiffs property from 1/3 of an acre to 5 acres. Plaintiff
contended that after the amendment, it would cost more to develop the property
than he could expect to make from the sale of lots so large.
49. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
50. Id. at 415.
51. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
52. Id. at 413.
[Vol. 21:67
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the regulation is zero, the regulation has "gone too far," and a tak-
ing has occurred. 53 But as shown in Scalia's majority opinion in
Lucas, and as alluded to by Justice Holmes in his majority opinion
in Pennsylvania Coal, the value of the property does not have to
be entirely diminished for a taking to result.
Under the second test Justice Holmes' announced in Penn-
sylvania Coal, the public benefit derived from the regulation must
be weighed against the harm imposed on the private individual. If
the harm to the individual is great while the benefit to the public
is minor, then the regulation has resulted in a taking.54 Here
again, this test contains ambiguity in that one does not know how
severe the harm must be, nor how substantial the public benefit
must be.
Under Justice Holmes' third test, the so-called "average reci-
procity of advantage" test, any benefit the regulation bestows
upon the landowner himself is weighed against whatever detri-
ment the landowner has suffered due to the regulation.5" This
test, too, is ambiguous. The weight courts give to the benefit and
detriment would determine the outcome of the case. What one
court may find to be a substantial benefit to the landowner,
another court may find minuscule. Although these three tests are
filled with ambiguities, taken together, they provide a framework
to analyze whether the regulation has gone too far, i.e. interfered
with the landowner's use and enjoyment of his property to the
extent that the government has effectively "taken" the property
from the landowner.
Since the Court decided Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, they
struggled with the notion of when a regulation "goes too far."
Instead of defining this phrase, the Court has developed the two
categories described in Lucas that are per se takings (i.e. physical
invasion and deprivation of all economically beneficial use). Other
than these two categories, however, the Court has basically
engaged in "ad hoc, factual inquires "56 and has developed factors,
similar to those in Pennsylvania Coal, to consider in deciding
whether a taking has occurred. In Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, the last major takings case decided before
Lucas, the Court described a new factor to consider: "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
53. Blank
54. Id. at 413-14.
55. Id. at 415.
56. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
1998]
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backed expectations."57 In this case, the majority held that the
restrictions imposed on the plaintiff, due to its building being des-
ignated a landmark, did not result in a taking of the plaintiffs
property because the restrictions did not interfere with the plain-
tiffs current business-i.e. it did not interfere with the plaintiffs
"investment-backed expectations."5 8 The Court also reaffirmed
the Pennsylvania Coal factor of diminution in value, but stated
that a decrease in the value of the property alone is not sufficient
to constitute a taking.59 Of course, one may conclude from Lucas
that if all of the value of the property is diminished by a regula-
tion, and the use prohibited is not a nuisance,6 ° then there has
been a taking. But short of total diminution of value of the land,
presumably Penn Central still applies and more than a mere
decrease in value is required.
Justice Rehnquist, along with two other Justices, dissented in
the Penn Central case. He argued that New York City had
imposed a substantial cost on less than 0.1% of the landowners of
the city "for the general benefit of all its people."6 According to
Justice Rehnquist, "[i]t is exactly this kind of imposition of general
costs on a few individuals at which the 'taking' protection is
directed."62 This argument goes to the purpose of the taking
clause-i.e. private individuals should not be forced to personally
carry the financial burden of regulations that in all fairness
should be borne by the general public.63 Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent perhaps carries more weight now because of the current
makeup of the Supreme Court. When Penn Central was decided,
Justice Rehnquist and his fellow conservative justices were the
minority on the Court. Now, however, the conservative wing is in
the majority, as it was when Lucas was decided. In Lucas, Justice
Rehnquist joined with Justice Scalia's majority opinion, indicating
that if the Court were faced with a case similar to Penn Central
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Although it is not stressed in this casenote, it is clear from Lucas that if
the use prohibited by a regulation amounts to a common law nuisance, no taking
occurs even if the property is thus deprived of all economically beneficial use.
This is because a landowner does not have an inherent right to use his property
in a manner that amounts to a nuisance, so the regulation has not taken any
rights away from the landowner. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022.
61: Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147.
62. Id.
63. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
[Vol. 21:67
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today, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion would likely become the
majority opinion.
To summarize the "traditional" takings analysis, the court
basically engages in an inquiry into the facts and circumstances of
a given case, and applies certain factors to determine if the regula-
tion involved has "gone too far." Such factors include the diminu-
tion in value, interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations, public benefit verses private harm, and average reci-
procity of advantage. Also, it is instructive to keep in mind the
purpose of the taking clause to the Fifth Amendment. If the facts
of a given case indicate that the regulation did not compel a physi-
cal invasion of the plaintiffs property, nor did the regulation
deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use, this tradi-
tional analysis must be applied to determine whether a taking has
occurred.
C. Analysis of King Under the Correct Interpretation of Lucas
As explained in Section A above, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals correctly determined that the State's denial of the § 401
water quality certification did not compel a physical invasion of
King's peninsula nor did it deprive King of all economically benefi-
cial use of her property. However, upon making this determina-
tion, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the State without engaging in traditional
takings analysis. This was error, and resulted in the court reach-
ing the wrong decision.
Instead, after determining that Lucas did not apply, the court
of appeals should have applied traditional takings analysis. This
would have involved using the factors mentioned above such as
diminution in value, interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations, pubic benefit vs. private harm, and average reciproc-
ity of advantage. In regard to the first factor-the denial of the
§ 401 certification surely decreased the value of King's land. The
value of land is determined by what the land would sell for on the
open market. A given tract of land will sell for more on the open
market if all of the land in that tract is available for development.
Thus, an eight acre tract of land on which all eight acres is avail-
able for development is more valuable than an eight acre tract of
land on which only six acres is available for development. In
effect, the latter example has two wasted acres, or rather, it is
merely viewed on the open market as a six acre tract. By not
allowing Warren to fill in the two acres on King's property, the
1998]
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state has effectively turned the peninsula into a six acre peninsula
as opposed to the actual eight acres. As a result, the value of the
land on the open market is decreased approximately to the value
of a six acre peninsula.
Also relevant to the value of land on the open market is the
cost that will be involved in developing the land. For instance,
land that is flat is easier to develop than land that is sloped, and
thus the flat land is more valuable. Similarly, land that does not
require the construction of a bridge in order to develop is more
valuable than land that will require such a construction. In King,
one of the reasonable development alternatives advanced by the
DEM included the construction of a bridge from one side of the
property to the other. This additional cost of development
decreases the price that the land would bring on the open mar-
ket-i.e. it decreases the value of the land.
For these two reasons, it is clear that the state regulation
decreased the value of King's land. However, the extent to which
the land value was decreased is not actually known. One can con-
clude that the value of the land developed as proposed by Warren
was $1.36 million, and that the value of the land not developed at
all is $3,700. One does not know, however, what the value of the
land would be as developed according to any of the supposedly rea-
sonable plans promulgated by the DEM, nor does one know the
extra costs involved in developing the property under one of these
plans. The relevant figure in this "diminution in value test" would
be the difference between the $1.36 million and the value of the
land developed as proposed by the DEM.
Considering the second test mentioned above, it is not clear
whether the investment-backed expectations test would even
apply in a case such as this. If so, it would seem to be interwoven
with the "diminution in value test." The investment-backed
expectations test first emerged in a case in which the plaintiff had
a going business concern operating on the regulated property.
The Court stated that the plaintiffs investment backed expecta-
tions were the profits it made from this business. In King, there is
no business operating on the peninsula. The expectation of the
owner, here, is the profits from the development and sale of the
land. But any interference with this expectation is directly
reflected in the diminution in value test above, so this test does
not add anything to the takings analysis under the particular
facts of this case.
[Vol. 21:67
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Next, the harm the regulation inflicts on King must be
weighed against the benefit the regulation confers on the public.
Here again, one does not have adequate information. In particu-
lar, one does not know how much harm has been placed on King.
Presumably, this harm will be reflected by the diminution in value
of King's land. However, even though the benefit of environmen-
tal regulations to the public is impossible to quantify, one does
know that the public gains a substantial benefit from regulations
that protect shellfish beds. It is important to note that the appro-
priate benefit to weigh against the private harm to King is the
benefit the public receives from wetland regulation in general, as
opposed to the benefit the public would receive from the denial to
fill in King's two acres specifically. The former is a substantial
benefit, while the latter is a negligible benefit. This test seems to
favor the State because wetland regulation does provide the public
with a substantial benefit and one does know that King's property
still has some value.
The analysis of the "average reciprocity of advantage" factor
is similar to the public benefit vs. private harm analysis. The pri-
vate harm is of course the same. The benefit that King receives
from wetland regulations is identical to the benefit of such regula-
tions to the public as a whole.
Finally, although the substantial benefit the public receives
from regulation of wetlands would seem to outweigh any amount
of private harm, this notion must be reconciled with the purpose
of the Fifth Amendment. Interstate highways, like regulations of
wetlands, provide the public with a substantial benefit, albeit a
different type of benefit. But no one would seriously argue that
private landowners should not be compensated when a highway
cuts through their property. Similarly, since the general public is
benefited by regulation of wetlands, the general public should be
willing to bear the cost of such regulations. Fairness dictates that
private landowners, who happen to have part of their land desig-
nated as wetlands, should not have to shoulder the burden of
these regulations alone if the regulation causes substantial dimi-
nution in value of their land.
On balance, considering all of these factors along with the
purpose of the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment, this case
should have been reversed and remanded to the trial court for
determination of the diminution in value of King's property.
Unless the diminution in value was found to be miniscule, the
1998]
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trial court should find that a taking has occurred, and King should
receive just compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In King v. North Carolina, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals misinterpreted the Lucas takings rule, and as a result,
misapplied the law. Specifically, the Court of Appeals misinter-
preted Lucas as holding that only two instances existed where
government regulation amounted to a taking: (1) where the regu-
lation compels a physical invasion of the plaintiffs property, and
(2) where the regulation deprives the owner of all economically
beneficial use of his property.64 In King, the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly found that the facts did not fit into either of these catego-
ries, but then erred in holding that because the facts did not fit
into one of these two categories, no taking had occurred.
In fact, Lucas did hold that the two categories above are per
se takings; but it did not hold that they were the only two
instances where a taking would occur. If the facts of a given case
do not fit into one of these categories, then the court must apply a
"traditional" takings analysis to determine whether a taking has
in fact occurred. Under this traditional approach, the facts and
circumstances of a given case are analyzed with regard to certain
factors such as diminution in value, interference with investment-
backed expectations, weighing public benefit against private
harm, and average reciprocity of advantage. These factors then
must be reconciled with the general purpose of the taking clause,
i.e. to spread the burden of regulations that in all fairness should
not be borne by individuals.
Applying these factors and considering this purpose of the
takings clause, this case should have been reversed and remanded
to the trial court for determination of the diminution in value of
King's property. Unless the trial court found the diminution in
value to be negligible, it should have found the regulation to be a
taking and thus should have ordered the State to pay King just
compensation.
Don R. Wells
64. King, 125 N.C. App. at 385, 481 S.E.2d at 333 (1997).
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